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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION OF WEIGHT AND SIZE OF TRuCKS
USED ON ITS HIGHWAYS

South CarolinaState Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers'
Suit by plaintiff interstate trucker and shipper to enjoin enforcement of a
South Carolina statute which prohibited the use on state highways of motor
trucks whose width exceeds 90 inches and whose weight, including load, exceeds
20,000 pounds. The question for decision is whether these prohibitions impose
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce and whether this statute
has been superseded by the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935.2 The district
court held the weight provisions were an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce in view of the large amount of motor truck traffic in that part of
the United States. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding that
"few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of local concern as is the
use of state highways" and although the regulation involves a burden on interstate commerce, if the state action does not discriminate and in the absence
of national legislation especially covering the subject of interstate commerce,
"the burden is one which the Constitution permits because it is an inseparable
incident of the exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution,
has been left to the states." The court need only look to see if "it is possible
to say that the legislative choice is without rational basis." Here the record was
held to show affirmatively that there is adequate support for the legislative
judgment.
The first group of cases dealing with the general problem of state regulation
of traffic on its highways is that involving the well known state automobile license
tax. This type of regulation was upheld as a proper exercise of state police
3
power in the promotion of health, safety, and comfort of its citizens, the reasoning being based on cases allowing the state to exact compensation for the use of
4
facilities furnished by it whether the use is interstate or domestic. However,

1. 58 Sup. Ct. 510 (1938).
2. Another basis of contesting the validity of the statute was infringement of the due process clause of the 14th amendment. The district court summarily dismissed this contention on the basis of the decision in State ex rel.
Daniel v. John P. Nutt Co., 180 S. C. 19, 185 S. E. 25 (1935), which held
the same statute valid saying that reasonable regulations in this respect are
within the police power.
3. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U. S. 160 (1916).
4. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 699 (1882) (rates
charged for use of a city built wharf upheld); Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543,
(474)
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in requiring common carriers to obtain certificates of convenience and necessity,
state regulation has been limited to cases where the certificate is denied by
reason of highway safety and preservation. It is considered a burden on interstate commerce to deny the certificate simply because there was already
adequate service by carriers in the territory requested by the applicant.5
Morris v. Duby 6 was the first case involving the type of legislation found in
the principal case. A commission created by an Oregon statute reduced the
maximum weight on trucks using its highways from 20,000 to 16,500 pounds
because the greater weights were damaging the highways. The court upheld
the statute in spite of a federal aid statute which it was contended vested in
Congress the jurisdiction over federal-aided highways, saying that the Act of
Congress did not withhold from the state its ordinary police power to conserve
the highways in the interest of the public,7 and in the absence of national legislation on the subject, the state may regulate to promote safety on its highways.8
There have been many cases since Morris v. Duby announcing the same doctrine,
thus removing any doubt of its verity. 9 In fact, there is a tendency to extend
the doctrine to situations where the regulation is not as obviously for the conservation and safety of highways.1o As Buck v. Kuykendall1' illustrates, however, regulation with apparently no view to safety or conservation will not be
sustained, but query as to what will be said to involve safety. Regulations purporting to be for safety purposes and sustained on that ground could in reality
have been conceived for a different and unsustainable purpose.12

548, 549 (1886) (charges levied on vessels using state made improvements on
a navigable river upheld); Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S.
312, 329, 330 (1893) (in condemnation proceedings against river improvements
made by a state chartered corporation held that a state granted franchise to
collect tolls for use of improvements is a vested property right and therefore
is subject to just compensation).
5. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925); Bradley v. Public Utilities
Comm., 289 U. S. 92 (1933).
6. 274 U. S. 135 (1927).
7. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 291 (federal aid legislation for highway construction makes clear the purpose of Congress that state highways shall be
open to interstate commerce).
8. The court cites Hendrick v. Maryland, and Kane v. New Jersey, both
cited note 3, supra.
9. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932); Butler-Newark Bus Line v.
Sinclair, 34 F. (2d) 780 (D. N. J. 1929); City Grocery Co. v. State Road
Dep't of Florida, 60 F. (2d) 331 (N. D. Fla. 1932); Werner Transp. Co. v.
Hughes, 19 F. Supp. 425 (N. D. Ill. 1937).
10. Wald Storage and Transfer Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 61 (S. D. Tex.
1933) (state commission refused permit to use highways, under statute allowing such refusal, on grounds pertaining to highway conservation and where
existing common carrier service was already adequate and was held a proper
exercise of police power to restrict use of roads to purpose for which they were
primarily designed viz., effective, safe, and convenient use by the general public).
11. 267 U. S.307 (1925).
12. Butler-Newark Bus Line v. Sinclair, 34 F. (2d) 780 (D. N. J. 1929)
(permission denied to operate a public omnibus over a parkway. In sustaining
the denial, the court considers at length the history, development, and purpose
of the park, its beautification, etc. Then it states that aesthetic grounds aren't
the only ones, that the street was narrow and Pavement was not designed for
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One of the grounds upon which plaintiff attacked the statute in the principal
case was that it was superseded by the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935.13
The Supreme Court did not give this contention much consideration, merely mentioning the lower court's ruling that the state statute was not superseded. The
district court went into the problem thoroughly, though, concluding that Section
22514 dealing specifically with sizes and weights of vehicles precludes their
regulation under Section 204 (a) (1) and (2)15 which authorized the commission
to establish reasonable requirements with respect to "safety of operation and
equipment," and "standards of equipment," the rule of statutory interpretation
being that general language, although broad enough to include it, will not be
held to apply to a matter specially dealt with in another part of the same enactment. As to the applicability of Section 225, the court quotes from L. & L.
Freight Lines v. Railroad Comm. of Florida,16 "The authority is merely to 'investigate and report on' the 'need' for federal regulation of sizes and weightsa wholly prospective matter, clearly indicating an absence of intent to presently
regulate in that respect.
.17 This interpretation is supported by other
cases.18
In the principal type of case it should be borne in mind that although Congress can prescribe sizes and weights of interstate vehicles under the commerce
clause, until it does so, there would be no regulation at all if not done by the
states. There must be control of some sort, otherwise chaotic conditions would
quickly develop. This is in further justification of the doctrine that in the absence of congressional legislation on the subject, the states have the power to
regulate an inherently local matter.
CHARLES

M.

WALKER

the harmful heavy traffic); note (1933) 32 MiCm. L. REv. 267 (commenting on
the Wald case, note 11, supra, the writer says that the obvious purpose of the
Texas statute was to curb contract carrier competition. But the court held
that although the statute did not authorize the commission to deny the permit
on the ground of highway conservation alone, such authority was assumed since
highway conservation was the general policy underlying the statute. The
writer further states that the liberal interpretation by the court shows a
tendency for allowing wider power of state control).
13. 49 STAT. 546, 49 U. S. C. § 304 (1935).
14. 49 STAT. 566, 49 U. S. C. § 325 (1935).
15. Id. at 546, 49 U. S. C. § 304 (1935).
16. 17 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D. Fla. 1936).
17. 17 F. Supp. 803 (E. D. S. C. 1937) (decision of the district court in
the principal case).
18. Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 19 F. Supp. 425 (N. D. Ill. 1937);
Lowe v. Stoutamire, 123 Fla. 135, 166 So. 310 (1936); Railroad Comm. v.
Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 92 S. W. (2d) 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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NEGLIGENCE--LIABILITY

OF VENDORS AND

MANUFACTURERS

Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp.1
The York Company sold to John Morell & Co., a meat packing company,
two ammonia compressors, equipped with manifolds. The compressors were
installed according to specifications. The machines were put in operation and
run almost continually for eight months when the manifold cracked and ammonia gas escaped. Tayer, the shift engineer in charge of the plant, pushed
the switch to cut off the moter, creating an electric spark, causing the ammonia
gas to explode, and producing injuries to Tayer from which he died two weeks
later. Although recovery was denied because of certain defenses, the source of
the manufacturer's liability was put on the law of negligence.
Where the supplier of a chattel is a bailor and is receiving a benefit, he owes
a duty not only to the person supplied, but to persons who might use it with
permission of the one supplied and also to persons in the vicinity of its intended
use, not only as to dangers which he knows about but as to those he could have
discovered by reasonable inspection.2 Where the supplier is a manufacturer,
the courts have developed two different approaches to his liability. The old
theory was that the manufacturer only owed a duty to those persons immediately
supplied by him on the ground that privity of contract was necessary. 3 Broad
exceptions were engrafted to this rule. 4 One was where a manufacturer of
chattels imminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind was negligent in
the preparation of an article intended to preserve, destroy or effect human life.
This was actionable by third parties who suffered from the negligence. Food
and drugs were included under this exception. The second was where one made
or sold an article which he knew to be imminently dangerous to life or limb to
another without notice of its qualities. Here also he was liable to any person
who suffered an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated.
The courts have stretched these exceptions until about the same result is
reached as if straight negligence principles were applied. The first exception
has been extended to include dangerous weapons, explosives, oils, automobiles,
bursting beer and coca-cola bottles. 5 As to the second exception, it has been
held that since he is a manufacturer he is held to know of those defects which
he could have discovered by the exercise of reasonable care.6 The new theory

1. 119 S. W. (2d) 240 (Mo. 1937).
2. See note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 774; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1336.
3. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842).
4. Sanborn, J., in Huset v. J. I. Case Thresh. Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865
(C. C. A. 8th, 1903). This phase of liability has been developed by BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 109.
5. The cases are collected in notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 672; (1925) 39
A. L. R. 992; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 340; (1934) 88 A. L. R. 527.
6. Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047 (1911);
Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924); Sutton v. Otis
Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437 (1926).
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is that set out by Cardozo, which puts the source of a manufacturer's liability
on straight principles of negligence.7
Restatement.

This new theory has been adopted by the

8

Missouri lined up with those courts following the old theory of liability of
In the earliest case on the question in Missouri, Heizer v.
Kingsland & Douglass Mfg. Co.,9 the court made privity of contract a requirea manufacturer.

ment for liability except where articles sold were necessarily and inherently
dangerous to human life, or where the manufacturer knew of the dangerous
condition.

This case was approved but distinguished in the case of Tipton v.

Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co.10

The next case, Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,"

did not discuss the two approaches to liability of a manufacturer.

The still

12
later case of McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co.,' has been interpreted by the

more recent case of Jacobs v. Frank Adams Electric Co.,'

3

as doing away with

the older approach through the exceptions and as applying straight negligence
principles. The Jacobs case employed this solution. While the McLeod case

7. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTs (1934) § 395.
An employee of
9. 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W. 630, 15 L. R. A. 821 (1892).
the vendee was injured when a cylinder of a steam threshing machine, manufactured and sold by defendants, exploded. The employee was denied recovery.
The court stated that the evidence showed negligence in the construction and
testing of the machine, but defendant did not know of the dangerous condition
and since the machinery was not necessarily dangerous the action based on
negligence must be confined to the immediate parties.
10. 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791 (1924). An employee of the vendee was
injured when an elevator sold by the manufacturer and vendor fell. The employee was denied recovery. Evidence showed negligence in the manufacture
of the elevator, but the manufacturer and seller had no knowledge of it. Employee
relied on the MacPherson case. Recovery was denied. The court held that
the MacPherson case would seem to be in conflict with the Heizer case, but
that the MacPherson case was not in point on the facts.
11. 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001 (1925). Plaintiff's wife,
while in a butcher shop, was injured when a bottle of Budweiser, manufactured
by defendant, exploded. A third person had bought the Budweiser from a
retailer and had set it on the counter near plaintiff's wife a short time before
it exploded.
12. 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. (2d) 122 (1927). Defendant manufactured oxygen
and sold it to plaintiff's father for use in his welding business. The oxygen
was delivered in steel tanks in which there was a pressure of 1800 pounds. Due
to a clogged valve, the tank exploded driving a piece of brass into the skull
of the plaintiff. In awarding the plaintiff $12,000 damages the court said, "The
early cases limited exception one to things in their nature destructive, such
as poisons, explosives, and deadly weapons. . . . We think the exception
should be extended to include 'a thing which when applied to its intended use becomes dangerous,' although not inherently so."
13. 97 S. W. (2d) 849 (Mo. App. 1936); note (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rnv. 247;
McCleary, The Restatement of the Law of Torts and the Missouri Annotations
(1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 28, 37. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence in the
manufacture of an electric panel board. While engaged in installing the board
upon the premises of a purchaser who had bought it from a jobber, plaintiff
sought to test the board in the usual manner by turning on the current and
observing if the results were satisfactory. Due to defective insulation, the
turning on of the current caused a loud explosion, and a flash from the board
temporarily blinded the plaintiff, causing injuries to his eyes for which he brought
the action.
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greatly extended the scope of the earlier exceptions to the general principle of
non-liability of manufacturers as pronounced in the Heizer and Tipton cases,
the court seems to follow both the result and reasoning of the earlier decisions
rather than the general principle adopted by the McPherson case and the Restatement.
The principal case, while reaching about the same result as the McLeod
case, has used the more rational reasoning employed in the McPherson case and
the Restatement, which holds a manufacturer liable who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily
harm to those who lawfully use it for a purpose for which it is manufactured
and to those whom the supplier should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable
use. 14 Thus the principle of liability is becoming uniform in its application as to
all suppliers of chattels without attempting an illogical differentiation between
types of suppliers.' 5
HARRY H.

BOCK.

14. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 395.
15. As to the responsibility of a manufacturer of beverages a more
stringent liability has been applied. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 445 (1936) ; Comment (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV.
73. Manufacturer-bottler sold a bottle of coca-cola to a retailer who in turn
sold it to a customer. The customer drank from the bottle and became very ill
from a deleterious substance (decomposed mouse) contained therein. The Missouri court of appeals allowed the customer to recover from the manufacturerbottler on the basis of implied warranty of fitness for human consumption.
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